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Round-tables discussing the resilience of critical infrastructure systems held in the United 
Kingdom, United States, and New Zealand have provided insight into how organisations are 
changing the basis of planning and investment decisions to enhance resilience. The events 
convened stakeholders to explore how resilience is embraced in their sectors and to identify how 
to advance practice. The overarching premise was to convene a diverse group who would not 
typically have an opportunity to engage with each other, to share their perspectives on putting 
resilience thinking into practice. The round-tables identified that early-adopting organisations 
are implementing approaches to decision making that embrace resilience thinking, but such 
approaches are not yet embedded in common practice across organisations that are responsible 
for planning and managing critical infrastructure. The findings emphasise that multi-agency 
coordination and collaboration is required to advance resilience thinking in professional 
practice and to move beyond traditional risk-based paradigms. Governance and policy 
interventions will help to encourage cross-sector information sharing and to enforce 
responsibility and transparency surrounding exposure to potential shocks and stresses. It is 
recommended that such interventions could expand on principles and practice in existing 
emergency management efforts, on the basis that such efforts are founded on coordinating 
various groups. 







Moving towards resilience-based approaches for infrastructure planning and investment requires 
challenging how infrastructure is currently planned, designed, delivered and operated. 
Decisions need to be driven not just by initial capital cost, but also by how infrastructure best 
serves its communities, and how it continues to perform when subject to various shocks and 
stresses. 
A short series of round-tables was held in the United Kingdom, United States and New 
Zealand on the theme of infrastructure resilience. The main objective was to engage with senior 
professionals (covering roles in government, industry and academia), who would not typically 
have an opportunity to engage with each other, to share their perspectives on putting resilience 
thinking into practice. The format allowed exploration of how infrastructure systems might be 
impacted by a range of possible shocks and stresses, how various decision makers would 
respond and what the consequential cascading effects of those decisions would be. The 
round-tables provided the basis for cross-sector learning and collaboration, creating a more 
informed view on interdependency, what is missing in governance frameworks and standards, 
and identifying measures to embed resilient design into modern infrastructure systems. The 
purpose of this paper is to share how the round-tables were convened and to frame insights 
provided from this process, within the wider context of advancing resilience-thinking in 
engineering practice. 
The round-tables form part of the Resilience Shift programme of projects and initiatives. 
They took place in parallel with a number of other projects designed to: equip practitioners 





with the tools and approaches that they need to put resilience into practice; understand what 
drives best practice through sector-specific research and through exploration of the role of 
policy and specific policy instruments; and pursue a common understanding of resilience 
within and between critical infrastructure sectors, working with sector experts, and transferring 
learning between sectors and geographies (see https://www.resilienceshift.org/ for more detail 
on outputs from these initiatives). 
There is a moral obligation of the engineering profession to consider environmental impact 
and to account for how infrastructure decisions made today will impact on the livelihood of both 
current and future generations. Techniques employed to put this wider responsibility into 
practice are highly varied; they are often unsupported by incentives to implement. As 
Hargreaves, Rogers and Cavada (2020) recently highlighted: practising engineers in consulting 
and construction are typically contracted to deliver projects and provide value to their 
organisation and the client; they can find it difficult to balance this with their wider obligation to 
society. Pushing the boundaries beyond this can prove challenging, but it is essential for the 
long-term well-being of communities and the planet. 
This paper reports on the insights developed from the round-table process and to help 
advance the application of resilience-thinking in developing and managing critical infrastructure 
systems. The discussion is grounded in existing theory and studies of engineering resilience and 
the intention is to help advance the resilience agenda in professional practice. 
 
2. Key considerations 
In this section we reflect on advances in the application of resilience thinking to infrastructure 





development and challenges with respect to governance and policy for supporting the 
development of resilient infrastructure.  This sets the context in which to review the insights 
from the round-tables. 
 
2.1 Definition 
Resilience provides a perspective for decision-making that, in essence, considers how decisions 
made today might influence the performance of infrastructure in the future. Existing reviews of 
definition (such as Alexander, 2013; Hosseini, Barker and Ramirez-Marquez, 2016; Tanner, 
Bahadur and Moench, 2017) provide good coverage of the issues but have not led to a 
definitive consensus, with the implication that there is a need for acceptance that various 
perspectives emphasize different arguments. Generally, resilience refers to having the capacity 
to maintain function when exposed to shocks or stresses. Approaches to resilience thinking that 
embrace greater complexity emphasize that an iterative and experimental approach that allows 
for learning is required (Tanner, Bahadur and Moench, 2017). Hollnagel, Wood and Leveson 
(2006) highlight that irregular and “unexampled” shocks and stresses need to be acknowledged 
when considering the possible outcomes of decisions, which is not necessarily promoted by 
traditional risk paradigms. 
 
2.2 State of the art: resilience in infrastructure decision making 
Resilience frames thinking on a presumption that future events will be unexpected, in contrast 
to traditional risk-based paradigms of infrastructure design. This was acknowledged by Park et 
al. (2013) in their “perspective paper” on Integrating risk and resilience approaches to 





catastrophe management in engineering systems, but the idea traces further back to Holling’s 
(1973) seminal work on ecological resilience. This reinforces the increasingly acknowledged 
inadequacy of design parameters such as a “1 in 100” annual exceedance probability for 
flooding, both in terms of limitations in ability to accurately identify the probability and in 
terms of increasing impact of such events that comes with urban population growth (discussed 
in, for example, Miller and Hutchins, 2017). Past disasters are, in part, attributable to a failure 
to acknowledge plausibility of the more extreme scenarios, even when there was existing 
knowledge. For example, modelling completed in 2010 suggested that there would be less than 
NZ$44 million of damage to underground infrastructure assets in 90% of scenarios for a 
1-in-1,000 year earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand (Sole, 2011). This served as a 
baseline figure for exposure. The costs from the earthquakes in Christchurch in 2010 and 2011 
greatly exceeded this with damage estimates exceeding NZ$2 billion. 
Several other formative publications have advanced resilience theory in engineering. 
Among them is Bruneau et al.’s (2003) conceptual framework to define seismic resilience of 
communities, which has been widely cited. Their underlying goal was to enhance the ability of 
infrastructure to perform after an event to allow a community to return to a normal level of 
functioning. Their paper was intended to set the foundation for a coordinated research effort 
across disciplines and makes two key contributions to advancing the discussion. Firstly, the 
focus is on the community, but covers various dimensions: technical, organisational, social and 
economic. They also conceptualised resilience in terms of four quantitative measures or 
properties: robustness (strength of elements or systems to withstand stress), rapidity (ability to 





contain losses), resourcefulness (ability to identify problems, prioritise and mobilise), and 
redundancy (substitutability of elements or systems). They did not provide definitive means to 
quantify resilience yet their concept had appeal and has been cited widely in literature. 
 
2.3 Call for cross-disciplinary, multi-organisational responses 
A potential shortfall of Bruneau et al.’s framing is the emphasis placed on probabilities to 
understand risk. It is increasingly acknowledged that such an approach has limitations because it 
cannot be applied to a multi-hazard assessment for an all hazard approach. This is a critical issue 
and requires balancing reliance on probabilistic risk metrics alongside more qualitative 
measures. 
In response to this is the promotion of a multi-disciplinary approach that is more 
accepting of expert judgement and qualitative measures. Park et al. (2013) criticize existing 
approaches to engineering systems design that are based on quantifying known risks. They 
emphasize that “[e]ngineering systems must confront dynamic and unpredictable environments 
and estimates of likelihood are notoriously unreliable” (p.4.). They highlight the necessity of 
various organisations, government agencies and stakeholder groups to coordinate – bringing 
together different levels of knowledge around the functioning of the engineered system and its 
connections to wider, complex systems. Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson (2006) view resilience 
from the dynamic perspective and suggest that it cannot be determined analytically but requires 
reliance on expert knowledge of the system, with consideration of the goals of the core 
business. Hasan and Foliente (2015) also take the position that due to the wide socio-economic 
impacts of disruptive events beyond the direct infrastructure impacts, a multidisciplinary group 





of decision-makers need to collectively understand the potential cascading impacts of decisions. 
The Overseas Development Institute (Tanner, Bahadur and Moench, 2017) formed similar 
conclusions in their review of challenges for resilience policy. 
 
2.4 Practical challenges / shortfalls / limitations in policy levers 
Scenario development and modelling is supported as a means for reviewing different possible 
futures and the social value of infrastructure decisions made today (Green and Chmutina, 2018; 
Hargreaves, Rogers and Cavada 2019). Practically, taking a more long-term approach presents a 
number of challenges; it requires extra resources to collate and model data and revised 
decision-making procedures. Hasan and Foliente (2015) and O’Brien and MacAskill (2019) 
highlight that lack of access to data is a current limitation to running models that account for 
future uncertainty and interdependencies. They also conclude that a range of modelling 
approaches have been developed but many are out of reach of those responsible for managing 
assets. Hosseini, Barker and Ramirez-Marquez (2016) call for the need for data-driven standards 
for resilient systems, but also acknowledge the need to aggregate expert opinion alongside other 
measures 
A key challenge in pursuing changes in practice lies in accountability and responsibility. 
We can observe advances in responding to climate change and consider how similar 
developments might be applied to other potential shocks and stresses. A fundamental basis of the 
Corporate Social Responsibility agenda that has emerged in response to sustainability concerns 
is to create wider accountability of organisations to their stakeholders, beyond the short-term 
financial performance of the organisation. Over the past decade there have been substantial 





advances in organisational disclosure to climate risk in particular. The rise of this reporting 
presents an example of how new practices can emerge from voluntary schemes to a global 
standard. On this, Andrew and Cortese (2013) provide a helpful review of this process through 
the emergence of the Climate Disclosure Standards Board. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This review has covered three key points: 
1. It establishes a general position on what resilience means in engineering practice. 
2. It highlights a need to move beyond established risk management procedures to 
acknowledge uncertainty surrounding an all-hazard approach. 
3. It highlights support towards fostering communications between the various 
organisations, government agencies and stakeholder groups to bring together different 
levels of knowledge around the functioning of the engineered system and its 
connections to wider systems. 
 
3. Methodology 
The round-tables involved participants with a range of disciplinary backgrounds, encouraging 
inter- and cross-sector communication. This format provides a means for participants to engage 
in reflective and challenging discussions about their sectors and to explore how to engender 
change. The round-tables gathered asset owners, council officers, health specialists, engineering 
design specialists, community leaders and academics, engaging 79 people across four events. 
Around 20 participants per round-table was considered ideal for allowing for a diverse range of 





stakeholders while also giving the opportunity for every participant to actively contribute to the 
discussion (in reality guest numbers excluding facilitators ranged from 16-25). The discussions 
require two half-days, ideally split overnight. 
Each round-table had a specific objective: 
 A pilot was held in February 2018 to test the methodology. 
 The London meeting in November 2018 concentrated on ports, their role in the logistics 
supply chain, and their dependence on supporting infrastructure systems. 
 A meeting in Berkeley in January 2019 (convened with the University of California) 
focused on city-scale modelling tools and approaches and their relevance and 
applicability for practitioners. 
 A meeting in Christchurch in February 2019 (convened with the Christchurch City 
Council) created the chance to reflect on the experience of recovery following the 
earthquakes in 2010/11, and particularly the lessons that can be drawn for improving 
resilience of the infrastructure as the city and region plan for the future. 
The pilot event involved group discussions on various shocks and stress scenarios to 
provide a basis for dialogue. However, the pre-developed conceptual scenarios tended to narrow 
thinking too quickly (this was observed in the pilot round-table). The design of subsequent 
round-tables was reviewed to place more emphasis on drawing out participant experience and 
their views on a range of shocks and stresses. The pilot also helped to inform focus themes for 
subsequent events. The overall process for planning and implementing the roundtables is 
described in Figure 1. 





The facilitators held discussions with each participant in advance of the round-table (where 
possible) to brief them and to help them prepare their contribution. A list of shocks and stresses 
was also developed to facilitate broad discussion. The list was modelled on the principle of the 
five overarching headings of the World Economic Forum’s global risk review (economic, 
environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological), applied with a more regional focus with 
20-25 shocks/stresses in total for each round-table. The list (see Table 1 for an example) was 
used to capture collective views on threats posed by a range of potential shocks and stresses for 
the local participants. The emphasis was not on the traditional likelihood-impact matrix of a 
typical risk assessment, but the capacity of the region and the organisations represented to 
respond (as indicated in Figure 2). Note that “respond” in this context does not just imply 
disaster response, but a wider capability to manage the threat. 
The exercise did not prescribe the size of a possible shock or stress and it was left to the 
participants to make an assumption about what might be possible. The goal was to acknowledge 
the deep uncertainty associated with trying to determine risk, and our failure in modern society to 
acknowledge the significance of low probability, irregular or unexampled events. It proved a 
useful means to provoke reflection and discussion over broad areas of agreement and limitations 
in knowledge (discussed in the next section). The intention was to move away from the comfort 
of a traditional risk assessment matrix which downplays the need to consider high-impact, 
low-probability events. It is more exploratory than other scenario techniques and could be seen 
as a precursor to adopting other methods such as the wildcard events described by Walsh et al. 
(2015). Other sessions involving short presentations from participants to summarise their 





experience on applying resilience thinking also proved helpful in providing a basis for collective 
reflection. Figure 3 demonstrates some examples of the round-table set up. 
Group discussions were recorded to allow for later review and thematic analysis of the 
discussion. Participants were offered opportunities to provide feedback immediately following 
the events, and on reports written to summarise the discussion (Resilience Shift, 2019a;b;c). Best 
efforts have been made to incorporate this feedback and to provide an unbiased account, but it 
must be acknowledged that not all participants took the opportunity to provide detailed feedback 
on the final output. The key themes identified helped to shape the focus of the literature review 
presented in this paper. They are discussed below with reference to specific examples and 
implications for advancement in practice. 
 
4. Findings 
While each round-table followed varied lines of discussion, some revealing insights emerged 
across themes of oversight, policy, relationships and information sharing. 
 
4.1 Organisational oversight 
Lack of strategic oversight is critical to address as a starting point. Dialogue across 
infrastructure operators and government agencies is crucial to developing shared understanding 
of resilience. Considering ports infrastructure from a national perspective in the UK provides 
an illustrative example. Lack of strategic oversight of ports inhibits coordinated response to 
major events. The constraints of commercial and political sensitivities identified in a prior 
study of the UK port sector (Shaw, Grainger and Achuthan, 2017) was reinforced in the 





round-table discussion. Due to the privatised nature of the ports sector in the UK, and the 
relatively light regulatory environment (compared to road, rail, and water for instance), there is 
significant fragmentation when viewing operations from a national perspective. Port owners 
are understandably reluctant to voluntarily share information on capacity and flexibility of their 
operations, given the competitive nature of the sector and commercial sensitivities. 
Additionally, while the ports themselves may be adapting for anticipated future demand, 
supporting road and rail networks are not necessarily developing at the same rate. 
Elsewhere, early adopter organisations have embedded resilience-based principles into 
their asset management systems, such as re-prioritising renewals based on a systemic view of 
asset criticality and vulnerability. See Barber and Golden (2012) and Davis (2015) for 
background commentary on examples that participants raised at the round-tables. Determining 
asset criticality is not a new idea in asset management but asset managers in the Berkeley and 
Christchurch round-tables highlighted that augmenting this approach with an assessment of 
natural hazard exposure is not yet standard practice. Given the nascent nature of resilience 
practice, an idea that resonated with participants in the Christchurch round-table is that it 
would be beneficial to support mechanisms for “norm shaping” – through information 
instruments such as voluntary disclosure, following in the footsteps of the climate risk 
disclosure efforts (see Keele and Coenen, 2019 for a review of various policy instruments). 
More broadly, most cities and regions are administered by multiple organisations with 
multiple levels of oversight authority for infrastructure. There are various private sector and 
public sector arrangements. In many countries infrastructure is delivered by private sector 





organisations, constrained by commercial priorities as well as public obligations. Changing the 
mind-set and culture of these agencies (both private and public) remains one of the principal 
challenges for developing more resilient infrastructure systems. 
 
4.2 Policy and guidelines 
In terms of more mandatory enforcement, it is not necessarily that entirely new rules are needed, 
but greater enforcement of the ones that already exist. In New Zealand, for example, the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 has a general purpose to underpin the management 
of hazards, require coordination on civil defence matters and encourage coordination across a 
range of agencies. The Act stipulates that a precautionary approach must be taken to the 
management of risk, even when there is scientific and technical uncertainty about those risks. 
Specifically, it requires lifeline (or critical infrastructure) utilities to “ensure that the 
infrastructure is able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a 
reduced level, during and after an emergency”; and  “make available to the Director [of Civil 
Defence] in writing, on request, its plan for functioning during and after an emergency” (outlined 
in Section 60 of the Act). It is within the Director’s power to “issue guidelines, codes, or 
technical standards to any person or organisation with responsibilities under this Act” (Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, Section 9). It does not appear to be beyond the 
realms of this power to require more disclosure of risk. Round-table participants with direct 
experience in lifelines groups have observed that this mechanism is not being enforced in this 
way but is a potential, existing, regulatory incentive for mainstreaming action. A recent study of 
a similar act in in the state of Victoria, Australia explains how the mandated sharing of risk 





information between organisations within sectors is resulting in positive outcomes through 
“raising the bar” of behaviour (Naderpajouh and Matinheikki, 2019) 
Further to this, more readily accessible standards and guidelines would be beneficial for 
“follower” organisations. Something more may be needed, such as a regulatory push or 
mandatory reporting requirements to mainstream practice. We are already seeing the promotion 
of climate and natural capital reporting to broaden corporate reporting and increase 
accountability of organisations to societal issues (evidenced in the efforts of the Climate 
Disclosure Standards Board, as discussed in Andrew and Cortese (2013)). Key to this is 
helping to more clearly establish boundaries of responsibility so that infrastructure investment 
today (both capital and maintenance) is distributed in a way that helps to establish fitness for 
the future. National guidance in the United Kingdom outlines that an “all hazards” approach is 
required (see Cabinet Office, 2018). 
 
4.3 Cross-organisational relationships 
A current lack of relationships and learning across sectors is likely to be detrimental to the 
future performance of critical infrastructure systems. This supports the view presented by 
Lloyd’s Register Foundation’s (2016) foresight report and a key motivation behind the funding 
for the Resilience Shift was to support learning and information sharing within and between 
sectors. Feedback from participants in the round-table series reinforced the value of 
participating in this learning and sharing process. By way of example, one participant 
described this experience: 
“The opportunity to hear from other sectors on resilience from an infrastructure 





perspective was something I approached with a degree of uncertainty… I feared I would 
not understand some of the technical aspects of some issues discussed and this fear was 
soon realised…what I had not expected was the significant and extremely valuable 
learning experience this provided.” 
Similar observations have been made in the wider body of work produced by the 
Resilience Shift. It is not the role of this paper to report on that activity in detail but the 
benefits of cross-disciplinary and cross-organisational engagement has formed a theme among 
the wider projects supported by the programme. One example is the Cape Town Day Zero 
initiative, which has involved the development of teaching/engagement material through 
filmed interviews that highlight how the crisis developed and how authorities responded. This 
has been designed to promote wider learning and multi-stakeholder discussions. 
Cross-sector communication is not a new idea for infrastructure protection and 
emergency management. For example, Local Resilience Forums in the UK have duties 
established within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and associated regulations to plan, prepare 
and communicate in a multi-agency environment. The focus is on preparing for emergency 
response. This is similar to Civil Defence groups in New Zealand. However, the principle 
could be (and is) being taken further. Following the experience of earthquakes in Christchurch 
New Zealand, round-table participants involved in managing critical infrastructure networks 
emphasised the value of the cross-sector networks created by civil defence groups, and other 
sector-specific initiatives are emerging in New Zealand to further foster relationships and 
joined-up planning. Pre-existing relationships greatly enhance the ability to coordinate across 





organisations in the event of a crisis. However, it does not take a crisis to see the benefit of 
these relationships. A participant from the telecommunications sector highlighted a shift in 
approach from focusing on fixing problems as quickly as possible to avoidance of loss of 
service to more strategic planning. They described how telecommunication companies have 
identified vulnerabilities within their networks (highlighted by recent earthquake events) that 
can be better managed by coordinating with another network owner. However, the participant 
suggested that the need to exercise the coordination potential available through existing forums 
is missing and that the “big challenge is communicating with top 250 businesses – they are 
ones providing services to the community. [It is a] real challenge to keep up to date [with] 
people’s expectations of possible events and failures” (participant quote). Another participant 
from the electricity sector described how distributors and power generation companies are 
working together through exploring a range of scenarios to learn about their vulnerabilities, 
how they might be managed and what investment should be prioritised. These are examples of 
multi-agency forums being established not just to consider emergency response but to inform 
strategic asset development and operations decisions for their assets. 
The strategic and operational value in convening people from different organisations and 
sectors to explore infrastructure resilience was demonstrated through the process of the 
round-tables themselves. The round-table discussions revealed areas where sectors might 
coordinate to challenge government investment practice, exposed where a new entity or plan 
may be needed to coordinate regional action, and highlighted examples of best practice 
management. 





For example, the shocks and stresses exercise (described in the methodology section) 
helped to reveal common concerns and areas of diverse views among participants. At the Ports 
and Logistics round-table in London for example, there was clear consensus that road and rail 
capacity was a concern for the sector. Round-table participants indicated there was limited 
capacity to influence this due to embedded economic basis of national infrastructure 
investment prioritising passenger movement over freight. In Berkeley, looking beyond the 
well-acknowledged hazard that earthquakes present for the region, climate change featured as a 
key concern; participants indicated limited ability to respond to that stress without greater 
regional coordination. The Christchurch round-table revealed that the performance of the 
region’s electricity distributor, Orion, through the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence had created 
a widely held feeling of trust in the ability of the distributor to respond to major shocks. The 
organisation’s prior strategic planning had resulted in investment in the network that limited 
damage (Fenwick and Hoskin, 2011). 
Figure 4 demonstrates extracts of participant responses to demonstrate these points, 
focusing on responses that placed the shock or stress as a potential high impact event. The full 
response set is not reported here as there was significant amount of noisy data, reflecting a 
range of opinion over the significance of the various shocks and stresses. It was not the 
intention of this exercise to develop a comprehensive assessment of risk exposure, but to spark 
discussion around areas of agreement and disagreement in participant groups. On the whole the 
exercise revealed significant disparity in initial assumptions made by participants, with only 
one or two clear themes emerging in the time allocated to the exercise. For example, 





cyber-security related issues such as data fraud or theft received mixed response with respect to 
possible impacts and capacity to respond. This does not mean that security issues are not 
relevant. Rather, in the context of the relatively open-ended nature of the discussion and the 
areas of focus of the participants present, this risk area did not emerge as a key theme in 
discussion. This may be partly due to cyber-security being a more emerging and specialist field. 
Related to this point is that some participants highlighted the challenge of responding in 
absence of more specific scenarios, which are a recognised way of exploring risk. However, 
the more open-ended nature of this exercise allowed for more emergence in what was learnt 
from the process. 
 
4.4 Data and information sharing 
Availability of data and changing use of data is also a critical factor in influencing how 
decisions get made in managing assets for a range of scenarios. There are increasing 
capabilities to gather and analyse data on a wider scale to provide greater insight into system 
performance, but the data is often not easily extractable for timely analysis. This issue may not 
be a priority in business as usual operations but major disruption brings this into sharp focus 
(Blake et al., 2019).  Note also that modelling tools from engineering disciplines 
predominantly focus on information related to the physical infrastructure systems, often 
excluding the influence of governance and needs of the communities themselves. The direct 
function of infrastructure needs to be considered in the wide socio-technical context within 
which it operates, suggesting a need for cross-disciplinary work. As summarised by a 
participant at the round-table in Christchurch: 





“…we don’t have these serious conversations with the community around level of service, 
whole of life, and what you are prepared to invest in... In my career I haven’t seen those 
debates happen very often... But increasingly across societies (communities) are looking 
for consistency. There is a real challenge—let alone the challenges of matching up 
financing systems in your own business—with the GIS system with whatever is 
happening on the ground. That “supply chain of data” for decision makers – it’s a major 
problem.” 
This emphasises the responsibility of engineers not just to design solutions but to 
communicate risks and assumptions associated with different options. It also refers to financing 
constraints. This issue was raised in various forms during the round-table discussion. In 
London, for example, the prioritisation of investment into passenger infrastructure was 
highlighted. In Berkeley there was interest in how financing might be arranged to support more 
systemic investment in resilience. In Christchurch, rules associated with various forms of 
funding from government and insurance sources shaped available reconstruction options. 
Clearly, the participation of financiers and insurers in these conversations would be beneficial 
in advancing the resilience agenda in engineering. 
Perhaps the most challenging point of all is that public/community expectations should be 
considered in advancing the resilience agenda. A mismatch between what communities now 
expect of infrastructure services (continued service) and the reality of what might be provided 
following shocks creates vulnerability. While utility providers are working on strategies that 
are focused on increasing reliability, there is generally limited dialogue with communities with 





respect to acceptability of risk and how limited investment funds should be allocated to 
manage these risks (where considering future risk requires thinking more about future costs 
rather than just capital cost). The acceptability of current design standards was questioned 
several times during the round-table discussions. This is not just with respect to whether the 
standards are set at the right level, but whether these levels are acceptable to communities. As 
one participant described in their feedback following the city-scale modelling round-table in 
Berkeley: 
“We continue to build the same way without serious consideration for resiliency [because] 
on average we are still content with life safety objectives. This is no longer sufficient for 
a resilient community. The public needs to know that [fact] in the right way (not to scare 
but also not to mislead) so pressure can be put on decision makers to take resiliency more 
seriously in terms of resources allocation.” 
 
5. Conclusion 
The discussions in this round-table series have helped to establish current best practice in 
resilience thinking in infrastructure organisations and to identify possible opportunities for 
wider change in practice. Follow-up discussions with some participants have indicated that 
these round-tables have helped to build relationships and catalyse further initiatives. However, 
achieving the desired outcomes explored in this paper will require a process of change and 
commitment on behalf of those involved to continue to push the agenda and engage with 
cross-organisational initiatives. 
The intention of this paper is to help advance the application of resilience-thinking in 





engineering practice. It explores how industry best practice is evolving. Lack of strategic 
oversight to coordinate response to resilience is a core barrier to the coordination of resilience 
thinking across organisations, but there is strategic and operational value in convening people 
from different organisations and sectors to explore infrastructure resilience. 
Operationalising resilience is not mainstream in infrastructure-owner organisations. 
Framing of cost-related considerations is critical in responding to this. Also, availability of data 
and the changing use of data is a critical factor in influencing how decisions get made. 
There is growing support for and practice of infrastructure planning and management that 
involves an all-hazard analysis. Connected to this is support for multi-stakeholder and 
cross-sector forums for sharing perspectives and information, with evidence of some 
organisations already adopting this approach. This calls for more onus to be placed in 
developing and maintain multi-agency forums in non-emergency circumstances, so they 
become part of ordinary working habits that inform planning and investment decisions. The 
round-tables described in this paper proved to be one means for doing that. Finally, 
public/community expectations should be incorporated into advancing an agenda for 
infrastructure resilience. This requires raising public awareness around the need for investment. 
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Table 1. Example set of shocks/stresses 
 
Type Shock/stress description 
Economic/infrastructure Inadequate investment in power infrastructure 
Inadequate investment in rail infrastructure 
Inadequate investment in road infrastructure 
Inadequate investment in 3 waters infrastructure 
Carbon pricing 
Economic / geopolitical Energy price shock 
Environmental Sustained adverse weather 
Local environmental event 
Sea level rise 
Major natural hazard 
Geopolitical Failure of international governance 
Failure of national governance 
Failure of regional or local governance 
Organisational Fragmentation of service providers 
Lack of access to information/data 
Societal Food crisis (changing balance of imports/exports) 
Water shortage 
Labour – loss of institutional knowledge 
Community disconnect with civic life 
Technological Critical information infrastructure breakdown 
Power failure 
Data fraud or theft 






Figure 1. Round-table planning and implementation process 
 
 






Figure 2. Impact/response capability matrix 
 
 

















Figure 4. Example of participant responses, focus on responses identifying “high-impact” 
(light grey = low capacity to respond, dark grey = high capacity to respond), listed according to 
agreement with “low capacity to respond”. (A) London round-table (B) Berkeley round-table 
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